Sudan: Current Position (February 2026)

Liberty Score (Ternary)

▼ 22 pts since 2020

Ternary Coordinates (L + T + C = 100)

Liberty

▼ 22 from 25 (2020)

Tyranny

▼ 12 from 30 (2020)

Chaos

▲ 34 from 45 (2020)

THEORETICAL BASIS — TERNARY CONSTRAINT (L + T + C = 100)

The ternary constraint models political power as a zero-sum allocation across three modes: Liberty (distributed power with institutional constraints), Tyranny (concentrated power), and Chaos (fragmented/contested power). The constraint holds definitionally when T is computed as the residual (T = 100 − L − C), which the author acknowledges as a measurement limitation rather than an independent empirical confirmation. L is measured via Freedom House aggregate scores and C via the Fragile States Index. Future work should develop independent T measures (e.g., executive concentration indices) to test the constraint empirically.

POINTS BELOW
EVENT HORIZON

Sudan's Liberty score of 3 places it at the absolute floor of the dataset — 52 points below the Event Horizon. With C=79, Sudan has the second-highest chaos score recorded, exceeded only by Somalia in the early 1990s (C=89). The velocity of collapse is historically unprecedented in the dataset: from L=25 (2020, post-Bashir democratic transition) to L=3 (2025) in five years — a 22-point drop that erased three decades of governance gains in months. The 2019 revolution that toppled Bashir had briefly raised hopes for democratic transition; the military's 2021 coup and the subsequent SAF-RSF war have produced the fastest descent into chaos of any country in the post-Cold War dataset.

Civil WarFULL-SCALE

The war between the SAF (led by Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan) and the RSF (led by Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo "Hemedti") erupted in April 2023 and has escalated into full-scale conflict across the country. Khartoum is largely destroyed. The RSF controls much of western and central Sudan; the SAF holds the east and Port Sudan (the de facto capital). Neither side can achieve military victory. Ceasefire attempts have repeatedly failed.

Evidence: War began April 15, 2023. Khartoum: 60%+ of buildings damaged or destroyed. Estimated 15,000+ killed (likely severe undercount). RSF controls Darfur, Kordofan, parts of Khartoum. SAF controls east, Red Sea coast. Jeddah talks, African Union mediation: no progress. External support: UAE backs RSF, Egypt backs SAF.

Displacement & Humanitarian CrisisWORLD'S WORST

Sudan has become the world's largest displacement crisis, surpassing even Ukraine and Syria. Over 12 million people have been displaced (8M internally, 4M+ to neighboring countries). Half the population (25M+) faces acute food insecurity. Health infrastructure has collapsed. The humanitarian response is severely underfunded (~30% of requirements met).

Evidence: 12M+ displaced (UNHCR/IOM, 2025). 25.6M facing acute food insecurity (IPC). WHO: 70% of health facilities in conflict zones non-functional. Cholera, measles, dengue outbreaks spreading. 4.5M refugees in Chad, South Sudan, Egypt, Ethiopia. UN humanitarian appeal: $2.7B, 30% funded.

Genocide in DarfurRECURRING

Twenty years after the Darfur genocide that killed 300,000, ethnic cleansing is happening again — this time by the RSF and allied Arab militias targeting the Masalit and other non-Arab communities in West Darfur. El Geneina was the site of systematic massacres in 2023. The pattern — targeted ethnic killings, mass rape, forced displacement — mirrors the Janjaweed campaigns of 2003–04. The RSF is the direct descendant of the Janjaweed.

Evidence: El Geneina massacres (June-November 2023): thousands killed, governor executed by RSF. US Secretary of State Blinken: declared RSF responsible for genocide (December 2024). Masalit governor Khamis Abakar killed. Satellite imagery: systematic destruction of non-Arab villages. ICC investigations ongoing.

State InstitutionsDESTROYED

Sudan's state institutions have been destroyed. The central bank is divided between competing factions. Government ministries operate in exile from Port Sudan. The civil service has been unpaid for months. Universities, schools, and hospitals are closed or destroyed. The judicial system is non-functional. The democratic transition institutions (Sovereignty Council, civilian cabinet) have been dissolved. The state exists in name only.

Evidence: Port Sudan: de facto SAF capital. Central bank: competing operations by both factions. 90% of schools in Khartoum state closed. University of Khartoum: damaged. Banking system: largely non-functional. Currency in freefall. GDP estimated to have contracted 40%+ since war began.

External InterferencePROXY DYNAMICS

The Sudan war has become a proxy conflict. The UAE provides weapons, logistics, and financial support to the RSF (primarily to secure gold mining interests and regional influence). Egypt backs the SAF (as a buffer against instability on its southern border). Russia has courted both sides for Red Sea naval base access. The proxy dynamics make ceasefire less likely, as external sponsors have their own strategic interests in the conflict's continuation.

Evidence: UN Panel of Experts: documented UAE arms shipments to RSF via Chad. Egyptian military support to SAF. Russia's Wagner Group previously active in Sudan gold mining. Saudi Arabia hosts peace talks but has limited leverage. US, UK sanctions on RSF leaders.

The Lost RevolutionDESTROYED

The 2019 revolution that toppled Omar al-Bashir (who ruled for 30 years) was one of the most inspiring democratic movements in recent African history. Millions of Sudanese, led by women and young people, demanded civilian rule. The brief 2019–2021 transition period saw L rise to 25 — the highest in Sudan's modern history. The October 2021 military coup ended the transition; the April 2023 war destroyed what remained. The democratic movement's leaders are scattered, imprisoned, or dead.

Evidence: 2019 revolution: millions protested, sit-in at military HQ. Power-sharing agreement (August 2019). PM Hamdok appointed. L=25 (2020). October 2021 coup: Burhan dissolved civilian government. April 2023: SAF-RSF war erupted. Forces of Freedom and Change (civilian coalition): fragmented and in exile.

Composite Score

HCI: ~0.38 / Rank ~120

CAPABILITIES IN FREEFALL — WAR DESTROYS A GENERATION

Sudan's pre-war HCI of ~0.38 (composite ~38) was already low, reflecting decades of under-investment under Bashir. The war is now destroying whatever human capital existed. An estimated 19 million children are out of school. Health infrastructure has collapsed: 70% of facilities in conflict zones non-functional. Malnutrition rates in children under five have reached emergency levels in multiple states. The professional class — doctors, engineers, teachers, the backbone of the 2019 revolution — has fled the country. Sudan's effective HCI is likely declining in real-time, with consequences that will last decades. The war is creating a generation of children without education, health care, or stability — the preconditions for sustained governance failure regardless of how the conflict ends. Even if peace were achieved tomorrow, the human capital destruction ensures that recovery would take 15–20 years minimum.

LIBERTY SCORE TRAJECTORY: 1821–2025

VELOCITY OF COLLAPSE: Fastest Liberty Score Declines in Dataset

CLINICAL ASSESSMENT

Sudan is the governance topology's most devastating case study in failed democratic transition. The 2019 revolution was real: millions of Sudanese demanded and briefly achieved democratic governance. The 2020 peak of L=25 represented genuine progress — civilian representation, press freedom, women's rights advances. The collapse from L=25 to L=3 in five years is the fastest recorded descent in the post-Cold War dataset.

The lesson is brutal: democratic openings in militarized states without civilian control of security forces are inherently unstable. The 2019 revolution removed Bashir but left the SAF and RSF intact as autonomous power centers. The power-sharing framework (2019–2021) was a partnership between civilians who had no guns and generals who had no legitimacy. When the generals decided they no longer needed civilian cover, the coup of October 2021 ended the transition. When the two generals decided they could not share power, the war of April 2023 ended everything else.

The model assigns <2% probability of meaningful recovery within five years. The most likely outcome (~50%) is protracted conflict — a Syria-like scenario where the war degrades into regional zones of control (SAF east, RSF west) without resolution. The second most likely outcome (~30%) is RSF dominance — a new military autocracy emerging from the chaos. A negotiated settlement (~15%) is theoretically possible but faces the obstacle that both sides believe they can win militarily. Democratic restoration (~5%) would require military defeat of both armed factions, which no internal or external actor can achieve.

Sudan's 50 million people are living the governance topology's darkest scenario: a country that glimpsed democracy and fell through the chaos floor.

HUMAN CAPABILITIES INDEX

Liberty × Human Development: Sudan

59.2

HCI Score

Liberty Score

+56.2

Gap (HCI leads Liberty)

Neither

Quadrant Classification

LIBERTY × HCI: ALL 91 COUNTRIES

HCI TRAJECTORY (1800–2023)

KEY INDICATORS — PERCENTILE RANK AMONG 91 COUNTRIES

LIBERTY–CAPABILITY INSIGHT

With Liberty at 3 and HCI at 59.2, Sudan faces a dual deficit — limited political freedom combined with low human development. The 56.2-point gap suggests some developmental capacity exists despite political repression. Historical data shows exit from this quadrant is possible but typically requires either sustained external investment or a political opening that attracts capital.

Data: Human Capabilities Index (HCI) — 15 indicators, 91 countries, 1800–2023. Pearson r (Liberty × HCI) = 0.619. Download full dataset (XLSX) · JSON API